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INTRODUCTION
Shamrock previously cited the case of Volostnykh v. Duncan, Case
No. 20000288-CA, unpublished (UT App 2001) for the proposition that a litigant has a
duty to keep himself apprised of ongoing court proceedings. Pursuant to U.R.A.P. 30(f), a
copy of an unpublished opinion is to be provided when first cited. A copy is attached
hereto as A-1. Counsel apologizes to the Court and counsel for failing to provide a copy
with its first Brief.
ARGUMENT I
The trial court abused its discretion in setting aside Shamrock's default judgment
against Owner and Contractor.
Daedalus and Silver Baron argue that Shamrock failed to marshal the evidence in
support of the trial court's decision to set aside default judgment. However, Shamrock
provided this Court with every bit of evidence of excusable neglect that Daedalus and
Silver Baron offered to the trial court. The evidence consisted entirely of the Affidavit of
Alan Wright. The evidence he provided is set forth verbatim on pages 21-23 of
Shamrock's Brief. The entire Affidavit was attached as A-2. Another copy is attached
hereto as A-2 for the Court's reference.
Neither Daedalus nor Silver Baron offered any other evidence to show excusable
neglect. Despite the fact that both parties requested oral argument, the trial court ruled
without a hearing; based solely on Wright's Affidavit. (Addendum A-2)
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The court's decision was clearly against the weight of the evidence in this matter.
The defendants defaulted early in the case. In their motion to set aside their default, they
told the court they hadn't read their mail.
After their initial default was set aside, the defendants prosecuted a counterclaim
for years. They knew they were in a lawsuit. They knew their law firm was going to
withdraw. They again chose not to read their mail, which they admit was received.
Notices and multiple pleadings were ignored. They offered no credible evidence that they
did anything to keep themselves apprised of the case, or to avoid default judgment being
entered.
Daedalus and Silver Baron argue that the case of Interstate Excavating, Inc. v.
Agla Dev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980) supports the trial court's setting aside
judgment. It does not. In the Interstate case, the defendants claimed they didn't receive a
notice of trial setting or their attorney's withdrawal. When they learned judgment had
been entered, they immediately moved to set it aside. There weren't multiple pleadings as
in this case. And, the defendants in the Interstate case read their mail.
In the present case, the defendants admit they received notices and pleadings but
chose not to read them. Each defendant received a notice of withdrawal, and a notice to
appoint counsel. In addition, they each received not less than 8 additional pleadings and
notices. They simply state that it was their decision not to read items received by regular
mail. That, Shamrock submits, does not constitute excusable neglect.
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Daedalus and Silver Baron cite the Court's general discussion in the Interstate
case, concerning the setting aside of default judgments. However, they omitted the
Court's preface to the quotation relied upon. The Court said:
It is not to be questioned that in appropriate circumstances
default judgments are justified; and when they are, they are
invulnerable to attack. Interstate Excavating, 611 P.2d at 371
Moreover, the Court did not suggest that lack of diligence can satisfy the excusable
neglect required by U.R.C.P. 60(b).
Daedalus and Silver Baron insist that Utah case law provides for the court to
balance equities when deciding whether or not to set aside a default judgment. They direct
the Court's attention to the case ofKatz v. Pierce. 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986) However, the
Court in the Katz case did not suggest that equitable considerations can displace the
requirement for excusable neglect required by U.R.C.P. 60(b). It said "the court should be
generally indulgent toward setting a judgment aside where there is reasonable justification
or excuse ..." Katz, 732 P.2d 92
A fairly recent case by the Utah Supreme Court directly considered the
requirements for setting aside a judgment under U.R.C.P. 60(b). In the case of Jones v.
Lavton/Okland, et aL 214 P.3d 859 (Utah 2009), the trial court granted summary
judgment after the plaintiff failed to respond, and its default was entered. The Utah
Supreme Court stated their analysis began with addressing "the appropriate test for
determining whether a judgment should be set aside for excusable neglect." Id., 214 P.3d
at 862
3
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With respect to balancing equities, the Court reaffirmed the Rule's requirement,
and said the parties' equities do not eliminate the need for diligence. The Court said:
This does not mean, however, that a moving party is entitled
to relief on the ground of excusable neglect anytime such
relief might be equitable. We affirm the basic principle upon
which Airkem and similar decisions rested: that excusable
neglect requires some evidence of diligence in order to justify
relief. In other words, while the district court's discretion to
grant relief under rule 60(b) for excusable neglect is broad, it
is not unlimited. A district court must exercise its broad
discretion in furtherance of the ultimate goal of the excusable
neglect inquiry: determining whether the moving party has
been sufficiently diligent that the consequences of its neglect
may be equitably excused. Id., 214 P.3d at 863

But while a party need not be perfectly diligent in order to
obtain relief, some diligence is necessary. To grant relief on
the ground of excusable neglect where a party has exercised
no diligence at all, but simply because other equitable
considerations might favor it, subverts the purpose of the
excusable neglect inquiry. Rule 60(b)'s use of "excusable" as
a modifier of "neglect" makes clear that mere neglect alone is
an insufficient justification for relief. The neglect must be
excusable upon some basis.
It would be impermissible, for example, to grant relief for
excusable neglect under rule 60(b) solely because the moving
party would be severely prejudiced by a refusal to grant relief
while the nonmoving party would only suffer the
inconvenience incident to delay of the litigation. Although
considerations of prejudice and good faith are relevant to the
excusable neglect inquiry, to grant relief under rule 60(b)
simply because there might be some equitable basis for doing
so, absent any diligence by the moving party, would allow
relief based on mere neglect alone. We decline to read the
word "excusable" out of the rule in this manner.
4
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Therefore, we hold that, in deciding whether a party is entitled
to relief under rule 60(b) on the ground of excusable neglect,
a district court must determine whether the moving party has
exercised sufficient due diligence that it would be equitable to
grant him relief from the judgment entered as a result of his
neglect. In making this determination, the district court is free
to consider all relevant factors and give each factor the weight
that it determines it deserves. Id., 214 P.3d, at 864 (emphasis
added)
In this case, Daedalus and Silver Baron failed to exercise any diligence
whatsoever. On page 6 of their Response Brief, they state: "As the trial court made a
finding that there was due diligence and excusable neglect on the part of contractor ..."
(Appellant's Brief, page 6) Their argument is disingenuous. Indeed, it is false. The trial
court did not even hint that Daedalus or Silver Baron had exercised due diligence. The
only attention given by the court was to the contrary, that the evidence showed a lack of
diligence by Daedalus and Silver Baron. The court said:
Defendants here seem, at least in this case, to be less than
concerned at times about this case. It has been lengthy
litigation and the court is hard-pressed to really understand
how so many pleadings could be overlooked. However, given
the situation with counsel and the lack of personal contact and
a long-term relationship, the court will again excuse
defendants' failures. (Addendum A-3) (emphasis added)
There is nothing to even suggest the slightest diligence was exercised by Daedalus
or Silver Baron. The court was puzzled that they overlooked so many pleadings. And, the
court recognized that this was the second time the defendants' default was excused. But,
the court failed to apply the correct standard required by U.R.C.P. 60(b). There was no
finding of excusable neglect.
5
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This is not a case of setting aside a simple default only. Judgment had been duly
entered. It could only be set aside in accordance with U.R.C.P. 60(b). Daedalus and Silver
Baron chose not to read any of the pleadings or notices they received.
Shamrock had the right to rely upon enforcement of Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Multiple notices and pleadings were properly sent. Shamrock had the right to
rely upon the finality of judgments. Utah's rules are designed to protect all parties to
litigation.

•.,,.,„

Daedalus received their attorney's notice of withdrawal. They received
Shamrock's notice to appear or appoint counsel. Shamrock followed the rules by sending
8 additional pleadings and notices to Daedalus and Silver Baron. However, they chose not
to read any of them.
There was no diligence exercised by the defendants. It was clearly error for the
trial court to set aside Shamrock's default judgment, without finding there was excusable
neglect. Shamrock asks the Court to reverse the trial court's setting aside the default
judgment, and to reinstate the corrected default judgment. By doing so, all other issues
raised in this appeal will be moot.
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ARGUMENT II
The trial court erred by arbitrarily reducing Shamrock's damages, without
considering Shamrock's quantum meruit claim.
Daedalus and Silver Baron argue that Shamrock did not preserve the issue of
quantum meruit because the trial court found that an express, integrated contract existed.
Second, that Shamrock failed to preserve this issue at the trial court.
A.

The trial court erred by reducing Shamrock's judgment by an amount

estimated to replace a boiler and venting that continue to work and benefit the defendants.
Shamrock did not design the mechanical, HVAC, or plumbing for the Project.
(R. 669-670) The mechanical system was entirely designed by the Project's engineer,
Colvin Engineering. (R. 899, p. 194) Daedalus provided Colvin's design and
specifications to Shamrock for installation. (Contract, Addendum to Shamrock's First
Brief, A-1)
When Shamrock discovered a design defect in the specifications (fluing for the
boiler and water heaters was incompatible), Shamrock orally advised their Daedalus
contact, Roy Bartee. Bartee told Shamrock "to work it out" with Colvin. This they did. A
boiler with compatible fluing was substituted. Daedalus and Silver Baron continue to use
the boiler to service the subject building, and an adjoining building they constructed after
the Project.
Paragraph 10 of the Contract allowed Daedalus "to make changes to drawings and
in the Subcontract Work." Shamrock was to proceed with the changes. A change only
7
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needed to be put in writing if it affected the price of Shamrock's contract. The substituted
boiler did not change the price of Shamrock's contract.
The trial court erred by reducing Shamrock's compensation by the cost estimated
to remove the substituted boiler and associated venting designed by Colvin. Such would
constitute a redesign of Daedalus' system, something that was never part of Shamrock's
contract.
It is the law in Utah that parties to construction contracts frequently make changes
to the project as originally agreed upon. And, parties waive written provisions orally or by
conduct and create implied-in-fact contracts. See, Uhrhahn Construction & Design, Inc. v.
Hopkins, 179 P.3d 808, 814 (Utah App 2008)
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has held that even when contracts require
changes to be in writing, the parties can waive or modify those provisions. See Richards
Contracting Company v. Fullmer Brothers, 417 P.2d 755 (UT 1966) ("A contract with
specific terms cannot remain hypertechnically specific after the parties decide on extras
... in which event another contract arises based on a so-called quantum meruit theory.")
B.

Shamrock preserved its issue of quantum meruit in the trial court. In order

to preserve an issue for appeal, an issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way
that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal
Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (UT 1998) Specific factors to consider that help determine
whether the trial court had such an opportunity were specified by the court in Badger:
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(1)
(2)
(3)

The issue must be raised in a timely fashion;
The issue must be specifically raised; and
A party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal
authority. (Id.)

In this case, the third cause of action pled in Shamrock's cross-claim against
Daedalus and Silver Baron was for quantum meruit. (R. 46) Prior to trial, Shamrock
provided the following to the trial court in its trial memorandum:
Shamrock's Third Cause of Action is for quantum meruit. This
claim is in the alternative to the Second Cause of Action.
Quantum meruit is a contract implied in fact and is established by
the parties' conduct. It requires a request for work, the
performance of work, that the performing party expected to be
paid, and that the receiving party knew or should have known
that the performing party expected compensation. E & M Sales
West Inc. v. Bechtel v. Diversified, 2009 UT App. 299 (UT App.
10/22/09) Daedalus requested, and Shamrock performed all work
as agreed. (R. 604)
At trial, Shamrock showed how its performance was in accordance with the
written and oral plans and specifications given it from Daedalus. The only difference
from the written specifications was Shamrock's substitution of the incompatible boiler.
Daedalus told Shamrock orally to resolve the boiler design defect with the
Project's mechanical engineer. This Shamrock did.
In closing argument, Shamrock's counsel argued:
The third cause of action is for quantum meruit. If the court were
to find that some of Shamrock's work was not under contract, an
implied contract in fact was established by the parties' conduct.
Daedalus required Shamrock to perform all the work that
Shamrock performed. Shamrock expected to be paid. Daedalus
and Silver Baron knew or should have known that Shamrock
9
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expected to be paid for the work that Daedalus requested and that
Shamrock performed.
They only performed what they were asked to do. They only
invoiced them for what was done. There was an $ 185000
overcharge that has been corrected and the numbers given by
Mr. Barrus are correct. They are asking less than the amount
Daedalus shows were contained in the six Change Orders, three
of which they did not provide to Shamrock. (R. 901, pp. 27-28)
The trial court found that Shamrock did the work and was not paid. (R. 784, f 1)
The system they installed at Daedalus' instruction worked and continues to work now,
7 years later. (R. 783, If 1)
Daedalus and Silver Baron were not damaged by Shamrock's performance. They
claim the judgment was appropriately reduced because Shamrock failed to give written
notice of a design defect, and because a mixer valve wasn't installed until Februairy 2005.
However, it is undisputed that Shamrock gave actual notice of the design defect
early in the work, in the Spring of 2004, before the contract was signed. The defendants
had the same protection they would have received from a written notice.
Shamrock substantially completed its work in December 2004. Thereafter, a
Temporary Occupancy Certificate was issued, and two months later, in February, the
mixer valve issue was resolved. Daedalus didn't even have afinalwalk-through with its
subcontractors until May 2005.
At trial, neither Daedalus nor Silver Baron offered any credible evidence of
damages they suffered as a result of not receiving written notice of the design defect.
And, except for two months of heat fluctuations, the mixer valve didn't cause any
10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

damages. The trial court found Shamrock was not responsible for any delay damages or
lost rent. (R. 689-690)
What the court found, was that Daedalus and Silver Baron weren't happy with the
system they received, and that Shamrock didn't have the right to substitute the boiler even
though the boiler Daedalus asked for could not be installed, and even though Daedalus'
Roy Bartee told Shamrock to "work it out" with the Project's mechanical engineer.
Because Shamrock raised the quantum meruit issue in the trial court, it was
preserved for appeal. And, it was clearly erroneous for the trial court to arbitrarily reduce
Shamrock's damages when the defendants weren't damaged.
ARGUMENT III
Shamrock's failure to give written notice of the owner's and contractor's defective
design was not a material breach of a contract when actual notice was given before
the contract was signed, and lack of written notice didn't damage defendants.
Daedalus and Silver Baron argue Shamrock failed to marshal evidence relied upon
by the trial court. The undersigned believed that it did marshal the evidence appropriately.
Shamrock admitted the parties' contract required written notice of design defects in
Daedalus' plans and specifications. Shamrock admits it did not give written notice of the
defect at the time it was discovered.
The contract was not signed at the time Shamrock gave actual notice of the design
defect. When notified, Daedalus' Roy Bartee instructed Shamrock to "work it out" with
the Project's mechanical engineer. Shamrock did just that.

11
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A material breach of contract is defined as:
"A substantial breach of contract, usually excusing the
aggrieved party from further performance and affording it the
right to sue for damages." Black's Law Dictionary 7 Edition
In this case, the parties' contract was not signed at the time Shamrock gave actual
notice of the design defect. Daedalus received the same level of protection they would
have received had they been given written notice at that time, or as the trial court
observed, at the time the contract was later signed.
Daedalus instructed Shamrock to "work it out" with the Project engineer. They
could have suspended work until a written notice was presented, or they could have
suspended work after the issue was put in writing in October 2004. They did nothing. To
presume they would have done something different if they had received written notice
would be pure speculation.
Both parties continued to perform. In fact, Daedalus insisted that Shamrock
continue to do additional work for more than a year after being notified of the design
defect. Shamrock substantially completed its work in December 2004. Daedalus orally
requested additional work into the early months of 2005.
Shamrock's failure to give written notice in the spring of 2004 did not damage
Daedalus or Silver Baron. It did not defeat the object of the contract. And, the trial court
found that it did not damage them or delay the project.

12
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As discussed on page 41 of Shamrock's first Brief, the trial court said the failure to
give written notice was not a dependent or reciprocal obligation tied to payment (R. 785,
1f2,A-6,p.5,1J2)
Daedalus had the opportunity under its agreement to notify Shamrock that it had
breached the contract, and to have terminated further service. However, there were no
damages upon which they could have sued. A material breach of contract by definition
includes the right to sue for damages. When there are none, it should not be a material
breach.
CONCLUSION
Shamrock asks the Court to reverse the trial court's setting aside the default
judgment, and to reinstate the corrected default judgment. (Addendum A-4) By doing so,
all other issues raised in this appeal will be moot.
If the Court decides the trial court set aside the default judgment in accordance
with U.R.C.P. 60(b), then Shamrock asks the Court to reverse the trial court's arbitrary
reduction of Shamrock's judgment by an amount required to change the system designed
by Daedalus and Silver Baron.
The trial court's award of prejudgment interest should be affirmed because
Daedalus and Silver Baron received the system they designed, and required Shamrock to
build. They have had the use and benefit of the system since December 2004.
Shamrock asks the Court to award Shamrock a reasonable attorney fee for this
appeal. The basis for an award of fees against Daedalus is paragraph 17 of the parties'
13
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contract that allows an award of attorney fees to the contractor (Daedalus) to enforce the
contract. That entitlement is made reciprocal by U.C.A. § 78B-5-826 which provides:
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil action
based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed after
April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other
writing allow at least one party to recover attorney fees.
An award of attorney fees and costs against Silver Baron would be based upon
U.C.A. § 14-2-2 (3) which provides:
In an action for failure to obtain a bond, the court shall award
reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. These
attorneys' fees shall be taxed as costs in the action.
In this case, Silver Baron failed to obtain a bond for the Project. (R. 688) They
didn't even apply for one. (R. 900 p. 249) An award of Shamrock's fees on appeal would
also be appropriate against Silver Baron because the trial court awarded Shamrock fees as
the prevailing party. The Utah Supreme Court has held:
We stated in Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 895
(Utah 1996), "This court has interpreted attorney fee statutes
broadly so as to award attorney fees on appeal where a statute
initially authorizes them." In addition, when a party who
received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, "the party is
also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." Utah
Dep 't of Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991) Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319
(Utah 1998)
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
—00O00—

Valery Volostnykh
and Nellya Volostnykh,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Dorothy Duncan,
Defendant and Appellee.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No. 20000288-CA
FILED
February 01,2001
ll 2001 UTApp26 l|

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Sandra Peuler
Attorneys:
Shawn D. Turner, Salt Lake City, for Appellants
Dorothy Duncan, Salt Lake City, Appellee Pro Se

Before Judges Jackson, Billings, and Orme.
PER CURIAM:
Trial courts have considerable discretion under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to grant or deny motions to set
aside default judgments. See Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). Consequently, we will not interfere with
a trial court's decision unless an abuse of discretion is clearly shown, jcl
The trial court did not abuse its discretion under the circumstances of this case. First, plaintiffs did not provide the
trial court with sufficient support for their request to set aside the judgment. They filed a one page motion with no
supporting memorandum, no citation to case law, and no analysis of Rule 60(b).
Second, many of the issues raised by plaintiffs on appeal were not raised below and, thus, are not properly before
us. See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,1311 (Utah 1987) (stating "[u]nder ordinary circumstances, appellate
courts will not consider an issue, including a constitutional argument, raised for the first time on appeal unless the
trial court committed plain error"). For example, plaintiffs did not inform the trial court that the property was held by
a receiver, nor did they ask that the receiver be made a party to the lawsuit.
Third, contrary to plaintiffs' argument, the court successfully sent them notice of the October 27, 1999 hearing to
the 3705 South 3375 West address, though notice had been returned from the 3719 South 3375 West address.
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Plaintiffs did not notify the court of their changed address until after the default judgment was entered, even
though they had a duty to inform the court of their location and keep themselves apprized of ongoing court
proceedings. See, e.g., District Court Rule 83-1.3(b) (requiring "[i]n all cases, counsel and parties appearing pro
se [to] notify the clerk's office of any change in address or telephone number").
Plaintiffs have not shown that the trial court abused its discretion. "That some basis may exist to set aside the
default does not require the conclusion that the court abused its discretion in refusing to do so when facts and
circumstances support the refusal." Katz, 732 P.2d at 93.
Accordingly, the trial court is affirmed.

Norman H. Jackson,
Associate Presiding Judge

Judith M. Billings, Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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Joseph M. Chambers (0612)
HARRIS, PRESTON & CHAMBERS, P.C.
Attorney for Defendants Silver Baron Partners
and Daedalus USA, Inc.
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (435) 752-3551
Facsimile: (435) 752-3556
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, PARK CITY DEPARTMENT
6300 North Silver Creek Rd., Park City, UT 84098
WHITE CAP CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY,
INC.,
. Plaintiffs,
* AFFIDAVIT OF ALAN E. WRIGHT
*
*

vs.

•Civil No.: 050500453
STAR MOUNTAIN CONSTRUCTION,
*
INC., ED ZITE, SILVER BARON
Judge Bruee C. Lubeck
PARTNERS, L.C., DAEDALUS USA, INC
FRED W. FAIRCLOUGH, JR., CHRISTINE
FAIRCLOUGH, THOMAS STREBEL dba
RESORT CONSTRUCTION DRYWALL,
IDAHO PACIFIC LUMBER COMPANY,
INC., BINGGELI ROCK PRODUCTS, INC.,
WESTERN STATES EQUIPMENT CO.,
INC., SHAMROCK PLUMBING, LLC, AND
JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants.
SHAMROCK PLUMBING, LLC,

*
x*

Cross-Claim Plaintiff,

*
*

vs.

*

*
SILVER BARON PARTNERS, L.C.,
*
DAEDALUS USA, INC., FRED W.
*
FAIRCLOUGH, JR., and CHRISTINE
*
FAIRCLOUGH,
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STATEOFUTAH

)
!SS

COUNTY of Summit)
Allen E. Wright being first duly sworn upon oath states and represents as follows:
1.

I am over the age of 21.

2.

The information provided below is based on my personal information.

3.

If called to testify in this matter I would testify as follows:

4.

I am a member of the Defendant Silver Baron Partners, L.C. and also a shareholder

and officer of Daedalus USA, Inc. In my capacity as an officer of Daedalus USA, Inc., I was
responsible for oversight of the construction of the Silver Baron Lodge, a large condominium, project.
The Cross-Claimant Shamrock Plumbing, Inc., acted as a subcontractor'on the project and was
responsible for the plumbing and HVAC installation. As alleged in the answer to the Cross-Claim
and the Counterclaim asserted by both the owner of the project (Silver Baron Partners) and the
general contractor (Daedalus, USA), the contract was breached by Shamrock resulting in significant
damages to Silver Baron Partners, L.C. And Daedalus USA, Inc., as outlined in the discovery which
is submitted and attached hereto as Exhibit A.
5.

With respect to Silver Baron's and Daedalus' failure to submit a notice of appearance

through a licensed member of the Utah State Bar, we would offer the following explanation:
The attorney at Jones Waldo whom had represented Daedalus and Silver Baron Partners in the
Shamrock matter was Lewis Francis. Mr. Lewis has represented us on various matters for over 10
years during which time we1 had been fully satisfied with his representation. When we needed
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someone to file a lien foreclosure action, Mr. Francis said that this was not his area of expertise, and
recommended Mr. Mike Kelly from his firm to handle those matters for us. After an initial period
of representation by Mr. Kelly in which he filed several lawsuits on our behalf, we determined that
he acted in a grossly unprofessional maimer on numerous occasions and consequently we could not
allow him to continue to represent Daedalus. We telephoned Mr. Francis and had what we felt was
a productive discussion with him regarding Mr. Kelly's behavior and our dissatisfaction with Mr.
Kelly's representation. We indicated that the situation as to Mr. Kelly was not acceptable and we
requested an audience with the firm's president to resolve the matter. Within a few days of the call,
we received a very terse emailfromMr. Kelly indicating that we didn't know what we were talking
about, that he was correct in all matters, and we were wrong and that he was firing us, not the other
way around. He then indicated that he had saved us the time of writing a letter to the firm's president
by copying him on the email. Importantly we never received any further communicationfromMr.
Lewis regarding his representation in the Shamrock matter. We understood that Mr. Kelly's
involvement was being terminated but not Mr. Lewis' involvement. To us it appeared that Mr. Lewis
was deliberately avoiding getting involved in a very explosive situation with another member of his
firm. While we were waiting to be contacted by Jones Waldo's president in response to Mr. Kelly's
email, and unbeknownst to us, both Mr. Kelly and Mr. Francis withdrew their representation of
Daedalus (and Silver Baron Partners) in their respective matters, and informed us via regular mail,
There was no further communication via email or voice and we never heard from nor were we granted
a meeting with the president of Jones Waldo. Neither Mr. Kelly nor Mr. Francis contacted us and
explained what the legal effect of their withdrawal would be or what we needed to do to protect
ourselves.
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We receive a significant volume of "client copies" from our legal representation in various
active lawsuits. Normally any legal matter, particularly one that our staff was under the impression
was being handled by the attorney (Mr. Francis), would not be routed to an officer but would be filed
as a matter of course. If a matter comes in through personal service or registered mail it goes directly
to the Office Manager, who then is responsible for reviewing the matter in-house and bringing it to
the attention of the appropriate officer. Because both of the pleadings, the Notice of Withdrawal and
Notice to Appoint came in via regular mail the staff member responsible for opening the mail did not
realize that the practical effect of the pleadings was that we no longer had legal representation on this
matter. We understood the mail which we received to be the typical client copies normally sent to
us and that the legal case was still being handled by Mr. Lewis. Mr. Lewis never contacted us to
orally inform us that he was withdrawing or what effect this would have on us.
In addition we would ask the Court to take note that as to the underlying dispute Shamrock
has been paid $ 1,084,3 84.45 on their original subcontract sum of $ 1,119,083.00. The remainder of
the dispute involves change orders and other matters which are legitimately disputed by Daedalus,
and are set forth in the Answer to the Cross-claim filed by Shamrock and the Counterclaim we filed
against Shamrock.
We would ask the Court to accept this as excusable neglect, inadvertence or other just cause
on our part.
Both Daedalus USA, Inc. and Silver Baron Partners, L.C., have a meritorious defenses to the
action and we would ask to be allowed to proceed to have this heard by the Court on the merits of the
claims.
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DATED this 19th day of March, 2009.

ALAN E.WRIGHT
Subscribed and sworn to before me on the 19th day of March, 2009.

Notary Public

C:Vdocs\jmc\S\Silver Baron Partners\Shamrock Plumbing\affidavit of alan c wrightwpd
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WHITE CAP CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY,
INC,
Plaintiff,
' vs.

RULING and ORDER
Case No. 050500453
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK

STAR MOUNTAIN CONSTRUCTION,
et.al.,
DATE: April 23, 2009
Defendants,
SHAMROCK PLUMBING, LLC,
Cross Claim plaintiff,
. vs.
SILVER BARON PARTNERS, LC,
et.al.
Cross claim defendants.

The above matter came before the court for decision on
motion of cross claim defendants Silver Baron and Daedalus
(defendants) to set aside a default judgment.

The motion was filed March 23, 2009.

Cross claim

plaintiff Shamrock (Shamrock) filed an opposition response on
April 6, 2009.

Defendants filed a reply April 21, 2009.

Each

party filed a request to submit April 22, 2009, and requested
oral argument.

The court has reviewed the pleadings and determined oral is
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not necessary.
law.

The issues are authoritatively resolved by clear

The court has a good deal of discretion in such matters.

Oral argument would not benefit the court. The court will decide
the issues based on the pleadings.

ARGUMENTS
Defaults wer£ entered March 5, 2009.

Counsel for

defendants, who had represented defendants for over 10 years,
withdrew but did not personally contact and advise defendants of
such. A notice to appoint or appear was filed by Shamrock but
defendants claim they did not receive that or it was
inadvertently overlooked by staff.

The answer and counterclaim

were stricken and judgment entered because of the failure to
appoint or appear. The affidavit of Wright, a member of
defendant.

It alleges long-term counsel withdrew by regular mail

and that correspondence was simply filed and not brought to the
attention of an officer.

Shamrock opposes the motion. After service originally in
2005 a default was entered February 15, 2006.
by the court on April 18, 2006.

That was set aside

Discovery then proceeded and

counsel withdrew on January 9, 2009, three years later.
Defendants did not respond to the notice of withdrawal. Shamrock
sent, to the same address, a notice to appear or appoint.
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It

notified defendants that a default and dismissal of claims may
occur if counsel were not appointed. After notice of entry of
judgment in February, defendants did not respond.

A proposed

order was sent to defendants and they did not respond, nor did
they respond to a request to submit mailed to them.

After the

judgment was signed March 5, Shamrock moved to correct it and
gave notice to defendants. No response followed.

This motion

followed.
Shamrock claims that getting notice in the mail, even if
regular mail, and ignoring it is not due diligence.

Defendants

are familiar with litigation, knew their attorney had withdrawn,
but did nothing. Defendants got notice to appoint counsel, a
default certificate, a proposed order and request to submit. All
were ignored.

This lawsuit at that time was over three years

old. A previous default was set aside based on the claim of
defendants, through Wright, that it was received by certified
mail and this claim is that the notices were by regular mail.
Further, there is no meritorious defense.

In reply defendants again urge the standard and presumption
of law in favor of decisions on the merits.

Defendants agree

they will assume the attorney fees.for Shamrock in obtaining the
default judgment and in this motion.
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DISCUSSION
The court is aware of the strong presumption in favor of
decisions on the merits rather than by default.

The court first

looks to determine if there has been excusable neglect before it
turns to an examination of whether there is a meritorious
defense.
Defendants here seem, at least in this case, to be less than
concerned at times about this case.

It has been lengthy

litigation and the court is hard-pressed to really understand how
so many pleadings could be overlooked.

However, given the

situation with counsel and the lack of personal contact and a
long-term relationship, the court will again excuse defendants
failures.
This motion was filed within weeks of the default judgment.
There is a cross claim and significant discovery arricl litigation
which the court believes fills the meritorious defense element.
While a close call, the court first finds and concludes that
under all the circumstances, the failure to appoint new counsel
amounts to excusable neglect.
Given the short time and given that attorney fees of
Shamrock will be paid by defendants, there is no prejudice to
Shamrock in resolving this case on the merits.

The motion to set aside the March 5 and corrected order of
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March 18, 2009, is GRANTED.

Defendants are to prepare an order in compliance with Rule 7
which incorporates this ruling and awards attorney fees to
Shamrock in obtaining the default and in responding to this
motion.

DATED this

day o

BRUCE C. LUBECK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 050500453 by the method and on the date
specified.
MAIL: JOSEPH M CHAMBERS 31 FEDERAL AVE LOGAN, UT 84321
MAIL: JOSH M CHAMBERS 31 FEDERAL AVE LOGAN UT 84321
MAIL: MATTHEW G COOPER 5282 S COMMERCE DR # D-292 MURRAY UT 84107
MAIL: LEWIS M FRANCIS 170 S MAIN ST STE 1500 SALT LAKE CITY UT
84101-1644
MAIL: MELVIN S MARTIN 5282 S COMMERCE DR STE D-2 92 MUR
84107
MAIL: HAROLD C VERHAAREN 5217 S STATE ST 4TH FLR S.
UT 84107
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THIRD DISTRICT COl'RT-S!;HH: •

Z0Q9HAR 19 AH 10= 30
Matthew G. Cooper, Bar No. 5268
5282 South 320 West, Suite D-292
Murray, UT 84107
Telephone: 801-284-7242
Facsimile: 801-284-7313

FILED BY—

MEL S. MARTIN, P.C.
Mel S. Martin, Bar No. 2102
5282 S. Commerce Drive, Suite D-292
Murray, UT 84107
Telephone: 801-263-1493
Facsimile: 801-284-7313
Attorneys for Cross-Claim Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY - STATE OF UTAH - PARK CITY DEPARTMENT
6300 N. SUver Creek Road, Park City, Utah 84098

WHITE CAP CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY,
INC.,
CORRECTED JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

vs.
Civil No.: 050500453
STAR MOUNTAIN CONSTRUCTION,
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck
INC., ED ZITE, SILVER BARON
PARTNERS, L.C., DAEDALUS USA, INC.
FRED W. FAIRCLOUGH, JR., CHRISTINE
FAIRCLOUGH, THOMAS STREBEL dba
RESORT CONSTRUCTION DRYWALL,
IDAHO PACIFIC LUMBER COMPANY,
INC., BINGGELI ROCK PRODUCTS,
INC., WESTERN STATES EQUIPMENT '
CO., INC., SHAMROCK PLUMBING,
LLC, AND JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants.
L
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SHAMROCK PLUMBING, LLC,
Cross-Claim Plaintiff,
vs.
SILVER BARON PARTNERS, L.C.,
DAEDALUS USA, INC., FRED W.
FAIRCLOUGH, JR., and CHRISTINE
FAIRCLOUGH,
Cross-Claim Defendants

This Judgment corrects a typographical error in the Judgment entered on March 5, 2009.
This matter came before the Court, without hearing, the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck
presiding, upon the Motion of Shamrock Plumbing, LLC for default judgment. The Court, having
reviewed the pleadings and file in this matter, and good cause appearing therefore, now orders
and adjudges:
JUDGMENT
That Shamrock Plumbing, LLC recover of Cross-Claim defendants Daedalus USA, Inc. and
Silver Baron Partners, L.C., the sum of FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND
NINETY-FIVE DOLLARS AND SEVENTY-ONE CENTS ($418,095.71), with interest thereonat
the rate of 2.40% as provided by law.
Dated this

/q day of
BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

ifi
I hereby certify that on the IL
day of March, 2009,1 mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing, CORRECTED JUDGMENT, viafirst-classmail, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Silver Baron Partners, L.C.
2900 Deer Valley Drive
P.O. Box 1937
Park City, UT 84060
Daedalus USA, Inc.
2900 Deer Valley Drive
P.O. Box 1937
Park City, UT 84060
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